PROC meeting 15 · 2025-11-27 — Committee Evidence — LegisWatch

Summary

The House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs met to study foreign interference in the 2025 federal election and the implementation of the foreign influence transparency registry. Appearing as witnesses were Charles Burton, a senior fellow at Sinopsis; Aaron Shull, managing director and general counsel at the Centre for International Governance Innovation; Emerson T. Brooking, director of strategy at the Atlantic Council; and Aengus Bridgman, director of the Media Ecosystem Observatory.

Charles Burton expressed deep frustration with the government's repeated delays in appointing a commissioner for the foreign influence transparency registry under Bill C-70, noting that promised deadlines of June, September and now December 2025 have all been missed, with officials now suggesting spring 2026. He warned that the commissioner may lack the independence from the minister that the legislation intended, and argued that the delays feel like cynical stakeholder management, possibly driven by institutional resistance from elites who fear transparency about their ties to foreign states. He recommended a strong, independent commissioner be appointed quickly to interpret the law and deter politicians from becoming beholden to foreign powers.

Aaron Shull outlined the core features of the registry—broad scope, an independent commissioner and strong penalties—and stressed that implementation must focus on simplicity of obligations, protecting diaspora communities from stigmatization, and ensuring adequate resources and investigative capacity. He recommended that Parliament treat the registry as a living instrument, periodically reviewing and amending it as threats evolve, and that the online filing system be made user-friendly to catch non-compliance. He disagreed with any suggestion that the registry should be weakened, emphasizing that the first prosecution must not collapse.

Emerson T. Brooking testified that Canada became a test bed for AI-enabled manipulation during the 2025 election, citing examples of AI-generated YouTube channels posing as Canadian news sources and deepfake videos of Prime Minister Carney spreading widely. He noted that platform policies, such as Meta's news blackout, compounded vulnerabilities by limiting access to credible information while allowing harmful narratives to flourish. He recommended revisiting the utility of bans on formal political advertising, as they are not evenly applied against influential actors, and suggested the foreign influence transparency registry could be applied to influencers advancing a foreign state agenda.

Aengus Bridgman reported that foreign interference during the 2025 election was minor and sporadic, but structural vulnerabilities remain, including poor data access, weak platform enforcement and a retreat from co-operation with civil society. He emphasized that the U.S. information environment had a far greater impact on Canadian discourse than state-linked interference, and that influencers now account for over half of political content and engagement. His single recommendation was for mandated transparency from platforms, arguing that without it, even small interference attempts could have undetected second-order effects, and he urged Canada to align with the European Union's approach to data transparency.

The committee also heard exchanges where members questioned witnesses on specific topics. Charles Burton, in response to Conservative MP Michael Cooper, agreed that the government's delays in appointing a commissioner suggest obstruction, and speculated that some prominent Canadians may fear registration due to ongoing relationships with the Chinese state. In response to Bloc Québécois MP Christine Normandin, Burton argued that any Chinese business investment is part of a coordinated state complex and that Canada is not sufficiently protecting national interests. Aaron Shull, in response to Liberal MP Tim Louis, stressed the need for information sharing between agencies and the commissioner's office to avoid a failed prosecution. Emerson Brooking, in response to Liberal MP Élisabeth Brière, noted that voluntary platform commitments were no longer in force in 2025, making statutory mechanisms necessary. Aengus Bridgman, in response to Liberal MP Stéphane Lauzon, said that the appearance of interference can be more powerful than interference itself, and that politicians themselves are victims of information manipulation.

AI-generated summary — may contain errors; verify against the official evidence.

Witnesses · 4

Charles Burton

Senior Fellow, Sinopsis, As an Individual

Opening remarks

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I've been asked to focus my presentation on the implementation of the foreign influence transparency registry. This is a subject I've covered extensively—from my June 2015 Globe and Mail piece, “The murky world of Chinese influence”, to five commissioned reports for global think tanks since 2017. More recently, I've detailed these issues in my book, released last month, entitled The Beaver and the Dragon: How China Out-Manoeuvred Canada's Diplomacy, Security, and Sovereignty. Civil society groups, particularly the Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project and the Canada Tibet Committee, have long lobbied for this registry. They viewed Australia's Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 as the model for what Canada could do, but the stakes are personal. Last December, Beijing sanctioned 20 Canadians associated with these groups, including me. When Bill C-70 passed in June 2024, our reaction was enthusiastic. The Canadian Coalition on Human Rights in China, chaired by Alex Neve and Cheuk Kwan, and the Canadian coalition for a foreign influence transparency registry, led by Gloria Fung, engaged constructively with Public Safety Canada.

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Aaron Shull

Managing Director and General Counsel, Centre for International Governance Innovation

Opening remarks

Thank you, Chair, and members of the committee. I'm going to focus my remarks on three things: first, the threat environment that led us to this moment and discussion; second, the core features of the made-in-Canada registry model; and third—probably most important for what I'm going to recommend that you focus on—key considerations for an effective, fair and timely implementation of the registry. What led us here? I don't need to tell anyone in this room that there's mounting evidence of foreign interference, covert efforts to influence elections, intimidation and harassment of members of Parliament and diaspora communities, and covert funding networks and pressure campaigns. These are deceptive, coercive and covert activities done by foreign states and their proxies in Canada. To be clear, this is distinct from legitimate and open engagement, normal diplomacy, transparent lobbying and advocacy that's identified and accountable. The central problem is not, therefore, foreign engagement per se, but foreign engagement that is covert, deceptive or coercive, and this is what the registry is designed to catch. The point is this: If you are acting in Canada at the direction of a…

Emerson T. Brooking

Director of Strategy and Resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council

Opening remarks

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before this committee today regarding the threat of foreign interference in the 2025 federal election. I'm especially pleased to offer my perspective as director of a U.S.-based research centre that counters online foreign interference and someone who has spent years working to uphold Canada's digital sovereignty, most recently as an associate member of the Canadian Digital Media Research Network. I've overseen several election defence efforts this past year, including in France, Moldova, Poland and the United States. Canada's was unique. Canada is not the nation most targeted by foreign interference, but it has become a clear test bed for AI-enabled manipulation, and it is especially vulnerable to changes in the policies of large social media companies. Rules set in Silicon Valley have a clear and disproportionate effect on the Canadian public. Let me give you an example. In July, the DFRLab identified 42 AI-generated YouTube channels posing as Canadian news sources and focusing extensively on allegations of voter fraud and especially on Alberta separatism. These channels used low-quality AI imagery, AI voices and AI scripts. One video,…

Full testimony ↗