This House of Commons committee meeting on Bill C-22, a lawful access bill, heard from six witnesses: Christiane Saad (Canadian Bar Association), Alexander Surgenor (Canadian Constitution Foundation), Matthew Hatfield (OpenMedia), Khaled Alqazzaz (Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council), Tim McSorley (Centre for Free Expression), and Udbhav Tiwari (Signal).
Christiane Saad said Bill C-22 bundles two distinct regimes that should be separate bills, and criticized the lack of evidence that current laws are insufficient. She argued that part 1's new "subscriber information" production order, based on reasonable suspicion, is too broad and could reach a "biographical core," and that part 2 would effectively require building back doors into systems, creating vulnerabilities. The CBA recommended splitting the bill, removing ministerial orders from part 2, strengthening the definition of "systemic vulnerability" to protect encryption, and having the government bear costs and risks.
Alexander Surgenor argued the bill would establish a powerful surveillance regime that captures metadata—information about communications and location—for up to a year, allowing the state to track the "innocuous comings and goings" of ordinary citizens without their knowledge. He said the definition of "electronic service provider" is so broad that any provider could quickly become a "core provider" subject to invasive orders, and that claims of safety are undermined by data breaches in allied nations.
Matthew Hatfield said limited amendments cannot fix Bill C-22 and that part 2 should be largely struck. He compared the bill unfavorably to the U.S. CALEA, noting that CALEA covers only telecoms and requires no metadata retention, while Bill C-22 would require a year of metadata on every Canadian. He argued the bill can circumvent encryption without technically breaking it, and that the government's promise of narrow protections is ineffective because the bill grants cabinet the power to reinterpret any term.
Khaled Alqazzaz said Bill C-22 should be withdrawn, or at least part 2 removed and part 1's lower threshold for subscriber information amended. He warned that expanded surveillance disproportionately affects Muslim, racialized and other marginalized communities, and that the low "reasonable grounds to suspect" standard for foreign requests, combined with a lack of dual criminality, could enable transnational repression against activists and refugees in Canada.
Tim McSorley said the bill poses a serious risk to privacy, which is fundamental to free expression and democratic discourse. He highlighted that the new production orders under part 1 are not limited to telecoms and could reach sensitive data like medical appointments, and that part 2 would allow the government to require system modifications that threaten encryption and mandate metadata retention. He also noted that the bill would enable data-sharing agreements with the U.S. that could bypass Canadian oversight.
Udbhav Tiwari said Signal will not build surveillance into its service and would leave Canada rather than comply. He argued the bill's open-ended power to compel system re-engineering would undermine encryption, force the creation of hidden surveillance features, and mandate metadata retention that builds a "goldmine of intimate data." He recommended withdrawing part 2, or if not, requiring prior judicial authorization, independent technical scrutiny, and a hard line protecting encryption and prohibiting forced metadata collection.
A procedural debate arose when Frank Caputo raised a point of privilege, arguing that members' privileges were breached because briefs from the Privacy Commissioner, OpenMedia and Apple were not distributed in time for the amendment deadline. After discussion, the chair ruled the point was not a new matter, and Caputo challenged the ruling, which was sustained by a vote. The committee then adjourned.
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